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Human Rights Strategies in an Age of Counter-Terrorism 
 
Daniel Moeckli 
 
 
The reaction to the events of 11 September 2001 and later terrorist attacks have posed 
a major challenge to the protection, and indeed the very concept, of human rights. In 
the name of the ‘war on terror’, law enforcement agencies have been granted 
unprecedented powers,1 people have been detained without charge or trial,2 and the 
prohibition of torture has been questioned by academics3 and systematically 
undermined by governments.4 Whilst this shift away from liberty and towards more 
repressive criminal justice policies forms the backdrop to this paper, it is not my aim 
to add to the burgeoning literature that explores whether or not it is justified by the 
necessities of the fight against terrorism.5 This paper starts from the premise that, 
even in an alleged ‘age of terror’,6 human rights do deserve to be upheld, and its 
intended readership are those who share this belief. I am interested not in whether, or 
to what extent, human rights should be protected, but instead in how this can be 
effectively done: what are promising strategies of challenging repressive counter-
terrorism policies? This, it seems to me, is one of the key questions, if not the key 
question, facing ‘the human rights movement’ today. 
                                                 
1 E.g., USA Patriot Act, Public Law No 107-56, ss 201-25; Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 
(ATCSA) 2001; Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005; Terrorism Act 2006, ss 21-33. 
2 For the United States, see USA Patriot Act, s 412; Disposition of Cases of Aliens Arrested Without 
Warrant, 8 CFR, s 287.3(d) (2001); Office of the Inspector General of the US Department of Justice 
(hereinafter OIG), The September 11 Detainees: A Review of the Treatment of Aliens Held on 
Immigration Charges in Connection with the Investigation of the September 11 Attacks (2003). For the 
United Kingdom, see ATCSA 2001, Part IV; A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] 
UKHL 56. 
3 A Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2002); M Bagaric and J 
Clarke, ‘Not Enough Official Torture in the World? The Circumstances in Which Torture is Morally 
Justifiable’ (2005) 39 University of San Francisco Law Review 581. 
4 See Saadi v Italy, European Court of Human Rights, Judgment of 28 February 2008, Application No. 
37201/06; KJ Greenberg and JL Dratel (eds), The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib (New 
York, Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
5 See, e.g., RA Wilson (ed), Human Rights in the ‘War on Terror’ (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2005); RA Posner, Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006); M Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of 
Terror (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2005). 
6 Ignatieff, n 5. 
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 On the side of those who are largely sympathetic to the idea of human rights, 
two main schools of thought have emerged about how to respond to the ‘war on 
terror’. According to what is clearly the dominant position, human rights violations 
committed in the fight against terrorism are the consequence of an exceptional lack of 
legal regulation and must thus be addressed by insisting on the rule of law and turning 
to judicial mechanisms. This invocation of the rule of law and reliance on litigation 
has recently been increasingly subject to criticism from a number of authors who 
argue that the post-September 11 measures are not exceptional, extra-legal 
phenomena but in fact firmly rooted in the law. Therefore, these scholars, whom I will 
describe as – for want of a better term – ‘critical’, warn against an endorsement of the 
rule of law and instead call for a ‘political response’. Their arguments made in the 
context of the ‘war on terror’, and especially Guantánamo Bay, reflect a wider 
scepticism in critical legal circles about the potential of the rule of law and legal 
procedures to prevent or rectify human rights abuses7 and corresponding warnings 
against ‘turn[ing] political conflict into technical litigation’.8 I will argue that the 
analysis of these critical scholars is largely correct but that their suggested 
prescription of abandoning the rule of law should be rejected.  
Section 1 gives an overview of the arguments advanced by the two schools of 
thought referred to above. Section 2 analyses the claim, central to the position of the 
first school, that the problem with counter-terrorism practices is their exceptional, 
extra-legal character. Section 3 examines the argument, made by the second school, 
that it is futile to insist on the rule of law. Section 4 tries to draw some practical 
lessons for human rights activists from this – rather theoretical – discussion of the two 
opposed positions. 
 
 
1. Two views of the ‘war on terror’ 
There are, of course, myriad different analyses of the relationship between counter-
terrorism and human rights. Nevertheless, two main sets of views can be distinguished 
that fundamentally differ in their diagnosis of ‘the problem with’ counter-terrorism 
practices and, accordingly, in their suggestions as to what should be done to protect 
                                                 
7 See, e.g., C Douzinas, The End of Human Rights (Oxford, Hart, 2000) 91. 
8 Ibid., 14. 
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human rights. Although this is a simplification, these sets of views will be described 
here as ‘the liberal’ and ‘the critical’ perspective. 
 
1.1 The dominant, liberal view 
For the vast majority of commentators who are critical of the ‘war on terror’, the 
fundamental problem with contemporary counter-terrorism measures is their 
exceptional nature. Though often not expressly referring to the work of Carl Schmitt, 
they understand these measures as being based on his notion of the ‘state of 
exception’ as the realm where law is suspended and the sovereign exercises unfettered 
discretion.9 According to this account, the emergency regimes established since 
September 11 are ‘outside’ the normally valid legal system – the exception to the rule 
– and it is this exceptional lack of legal regulation that carries with it the risk of 
human rights violations. The paradigmatic manifestation of this exceptionality is, of 
course, the US naval base at Guantánamo Bay, which has been characterised as a 
‘place … beyond the rule of law’,10 a ‘legal black hole’11 and a space of ‘utter 
lawlessness’12 where the detainees are left without ‘any rights whatever’.13 The fact 
that these are descriptions, not by human rights campaigners, but by English judges is 
an indication of the prevalence of this view. Even the then-British Prime Minister 
Tony Blair described Guantánamo as an ‘anomaly’.14 US commentators have used 
similar characterisations. Jordan Paust has described Guantánamo as a ‘legal no man’s 
land’,15 Gerald Neuman sees it as an ‘anomalous zone’16 and Harold Koh has 
                                                 
9 C Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (translated by G 
Schwab) (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2005) 12. 
10 D Hope, ‘Torture’ (2004) 53 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 807, 830. 
11 R (on the application of Abbasi) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2002] 
EWCA Civ 1598, para. 64. 
12 J Steyn, ‘Guantánamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole’ (2004) 53 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 1, 15. 
13 Ibid., 11. 
14 D Fickling, ‘PM denies knowledge of “CIA torture”’, Guardian, 7 December 2005. 
15 J Paust, ‘Post-9/11 Overreaction and Fallacies Regarding War and Defense, Guantánamo, the Status 
of Persons, Treatment, Judicial Review of Detention, and Due Process in Military Commissions’ 
(2004) 79 Notre Dame Law Review 1335, 1346. 
16 G Neuman, ‘Anomalous Zones’ (1996) 48 Stanford Law Review 1197, 1228. 
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maintained that the judgments of the military commissions convened at Guantánamo 
would be perceived as ‘based on politics, not legal norms’.17 
Also other counter-terrorism measures are typically described in terms that are 
meant to highlight their extraordinary, non- or quasi-legal, nature. In the House of 
Lords decision on the detention of foreign terrorist suspects (‘Belmarsh decision’), for 
example, Lord Nicholls stated that ‘[i]ndefinite imprisonment without charge or trial 
is anathema in any country which observes the rule of law’.18 Therefore, ‘[w]holly 
exceptional circumstances must exist before this extreme step can be justified.’19 And 
Lord Hoffmann equally stressed the exceptional nature of the measure: ‘The power 
which the Home Secretary seeks to uphold is a power to detain people indefinitely 
without charge or trial. Nothing could be more antithetical to the instincts and 
traditions of the people of the United Kingdom.’20 
 Counter-terrorism measures are thus understood as victories of the exception 
over the established rule (of law), and the human rights violations they entail are 
presented as the result of an extraordinary lack of law and legal protection. This 
understanding rests on a number of crucial binary distinctions: normalcy-emergency, 
norm-exception, inside-outside (the law), law-political power. This type of analysis 
leads its proponents to suggest a particular response to ‘the problem’ of counter-
terrorism regimes. The key to the protection of human rights is, according to the 
predominant, liberal view, to insist on the rule of law and to turn to legal institutions 
(domestic courts, international human rights bodies etc.) to reclaim these 
extraordinary spaces of lawlessness.21 
 Although he would hardly describe himself as belonging to the liberal 
mainstream, also Giorgio Agamben highlights the exceptional character and 
lawlessness of Guantánamo and the ‘war on terror’ in general. Of the Guantánamo 
detainees, he writes that ‘they are the object of a pure de facto rule, of a detention that 
is indefinite not only in the temporal sense but in its very nature as well, since it is 
                                                 
17 H Koh, ‘The Case against Military Commissions’ (2002) 96 American Journal of International Law 
337, 341. 
18 A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56, para. 74. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid., para. 86 
21 See generally, A Tsoukala, ‘Democracy in the Light of Security: British and French Political 
Discourses on Domestic Counter-Terrorism Policies’ (2006) 54 Political Studies 607, especially 614-
617 and 620-622. 
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entirely removed from the law and from judicial oversight.’22 To Agamben, 
Guantánamo is the embodiment of the ‘state of exception’, which he characterises as 
‘a space devoid of law, a zone of anomie in which all legal determinations … are 
deactivated.’23 But unlike the liberal commentators referred to above, Agamben sees 
this ‘state of exception’ not as ‘outside’ the legal order. Instead, it has a juridical form. 
In fact, ‘[t]his space devoid of law seems, for some reason, to be so essential to the 
juridical order that it must seek in every way to assure itself a relation with it, as if in 
order to ground itself the juridical order necessarily had to maintain itself in relation 
with an anomie.’24 Not only is the state of exception ‘the constitutive paradigm of the 
juridical order’,25 it also comprehensively subordinates the juridical order: ‘the law 
employs the exception – that is the suspension of law itself – as its original means of 
referring to and encompassing life’26 so that ‘the exception everywhere becomes the 
rule.’27 
 
1.2 The critical view 
This prevailing, mainly liberal, analysis and criticism of the ‘war on terror’ has 
recently itself been subject to criticism from ‘critical’ scholars. They argue that 
Guantánamo and other counter-terrorism measures are not exceptional at all. In fact, 
they contend, the very distinction between the norm and the exception, between law 
and lawlessness, is untenable.  
Fleur Johns points out that the US government has constructed an elaborate 
normative and institutional system at Guantánamo Bay (consisting of the military 
commissions, the Administrative Review Board, the Combatant Status Review 
Tribunal and other mechanisms) and concludes that Guantánamo, far from being a 
‘legal no man’s land’,28 is ‘a space filled to the brim with expertise, procedure, 
                                                 
22 G Agamben, State of Exception (trans. K Attell, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2005) 4. 
23 Ibid., 50. 
24 Ibid., 51. 
25 Ibid., 7. 
26 Ibid., 1. 
27 G Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (trans. D Heller-Roazen, Stanford, 
Stanford University Press, 1998) 9. 
28 Paust, n 15, 1346. 
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scrutiny and analysis’29 – ‘a profoundly anti-exceptional legal artefact’.30 Claudia 
Aradau similarly argues that Guantánamo is ‘not lawless or normless, but is filled 
with rules and regulations’31 and that it is ‘not … a singular and exceptional 
occurrence but … symptomatic of the transformation of law’.32 Pointing to ‘the sheer 
volume of … regulations and interpretations’33 governing the ‘war on terror’, Nasser 
Hussain equally rejects the notion of exceptional lawlessness. In fact, he maintains, 
‘what one witnesses in contemporary emergency is a proliferation of new laws and 
regulations’, almost to the point of ‘hyperlegality’.34 Thus, ‘norm and exception have 
blurred severely’35 and ‘the exception as it has historically and theoretically been 
understood, as a suspension of regular law, even a space of nonlaw, no longer 
exists.’36 In short, as Peter Fitzpatrick and Richard Joyce argue, ‘the exception is not 
to but within law’.37 
 Accordingly, these authors have a radically different view than the liberal 
authors referred to above of how those concerned about human rights should respond 
to Guantánamo and other counter-terrorism practices. To them, the notion of 
lawlessness is misleading and dangerous because ‘once such an idea of a space of 
nonlaw becomes commonplace the seemingly logical conclusion is to advocate the 
insertion of law, of more rules, regulations, conventions, and court cases’.38 However, 
Johns contends, given the legal mechanisms in place, ‘it is not upholding the rule of 
law that seems tricky.’39 Aradau similarly warns against ‘the endorsement of the “rule 
of law” by human rights lawyers, activists and even politicians against the exception 
of Guantánamo’40 and the ‘fortification of the legal space of the norm.’41 Hussain, 
                                                 
29 F Johns, ‘Guantánamo Bay and the Annihilation of the Exception’ (2005) 16 European Journal of 
International Law 613, 618. 
30 Ibid., 615. 
31 C Aradau, ‘Law Transformed: Guantánamo and the ‘Other’ Exception’ (2007) 28 Third World 
Quarterly 489, 495. 
32 Ibid., 489. 
33 N Hussain, ‘Beyond Norm and Exception: Guantánamo’ (2007) Critical Inquiry 734, 742. 
34 Ibid., 741. 
35 Ibid., 750. 
36 Ibid., 735. 
37 P Fitzpatrick and R Joyce, ‘The Normality of the Exception in Democracy’s Empire’ (2007) 34 
Journal of Law and Society 65, 76. 
38 Hussain, n 33, 751-2. 
39 Johns, n 29, 618-19. 
40 Aradau, n 31, 498. 
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finally, points to ‘the limits of the law as a response to an increasingly repressive and 
undemocratic sovereignty’.42  
 Instead, what is called for according to these scholars is ‘a broader political 
and ethical response.’43 This invocation of the need for politics reflects Schmitt’s 
insistence on the pure politics of the decision on the exception.44 For Schmitt, the 
decision on the exception is ‘a decision in the true sense of the word’ as the exception 
‘cannot be circumscribed factually and made to conform to a preformed law’.45 Johns 
advocates a ‘re-invigoration of that sense of the exception that may be derived from 
the work of Carl Schmitt’, that is, ‘of operating under circumstances not pre-codified 
by pre-existing norms’,46 as a way of restoring appreciation of ‘the scope for political 
action’47 and ‘decisional responsibility’.48 ‘Recognizing in herself or himself 
Schmitt’s exceptional decision-maker,’ she argues, ‘the functionary implementing a 
programme [such as Guantánamo] might come to experience that programme as a 
field of decisional possibility and impossibility, with all the danger and difference that 
that implies.’49 Hussain similarly invokes the political by again ‘insisting on an 
awareness of the limits of law’50 and repeating Schmitt’s call ‘for the pure politics of 
the decision on the exception, a decision that would break the “crust” of legal life’.51 
Aradau, finally, laments the fact that ‘[t]he law that governs Guantánamo functions 
through administrative practices from which decision has retreated … in a maze of 
institutions’, whereas ‘Schmitt’s insight on the arbitrary decision at the heart of law 
could become a tool for critical thought inasmuch as it made norms contestable and 
exposed their reliance on an initial decision and foundational violence.’52 In summary, 
the critical school of thought warns against appealing to the law, insisting on the rule 
                                                                                                                                            
41 Ibid., 491. 
42 Hussain, n 33, 735. 
43 Ibid., 752. 
44 Schmitt, n 9, 15. 
45 Ibid., 6. 
46 Johns, n 29, 615. 
47 Ibid., 635. 
48 Ibid., 615. 
49 Ibid., 635. 
50 Hussain, n 33, 752. 
51 Ibid., 753. 
52 Aradau, n 31, 491. 
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of law and turning to the courts as a human rights strategy and instead advocates a 
‘political response’ that would restore a sense of decisional responsibility. 
 
 
2. Exceptionality 
The second group of authors is, I believe, right to reject the prevailing characterisation 
of Guantánamo and other counter-terrorism measures as exceptional phenomena that 
are somehow ‘outside’ the normal legal order. Not only does this kind of account 
draw on simplistic binary oppositions – between the norm and the exception, between 
law and lawlessness, between inside and outside – that do not stand up to scrutiny: it 
may also serve to legitimise questionable boundaries between what is accepted as 
‘normal’ and rejected as ‘exceptional’. 
 To describe Guantánamo as a ‘legal black hole’,53 and thereby to imply that 
law is not implicated in the human rights abuses committed there, is clearly 
misleading. Both the detention and the trial systems in place at Guantánamo Bay have 
an explicit legal basis, originally in the Authorization for the Use of Military Force 
Joint Resolution54 and a 2001 Presidential Military Order respectively,55 and, since 
2006, in the Military Commissions Act of 2006.56 Furthermore, detention is subject to 
review by an elaborate system of different legal mechanisms.57 As far as the military 
commissions are concerned, the 2006 Act is supplemented by the Manual for Military 
Commissions, which sets out the Rules for Military Commissions, the Military 
Commission Rules of Evidence, and the Crimes and Elements (setting out the crimes 
punishable by military commission).58 Aradau’s characterisation of Guantánamo as a 
space ‘filled with rules and regulations’59 is thus apposite. Nor is there anything 
                                                 
53 R (on the application of Abbasi) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2002] 
EWCA Civ 1598, para. 64; Steyn, n 12. 
54 Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Public Law No 107-40, 115 Stat 224 (2001). 
55 Military Order of 13 November 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Noncitizens in the 
War against Terrorism, 66 Fed Reg 57,833 (16 November 2001). 
56 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Public Law No 109-366, 120 Stat 2600 (codified at 10 USC 
sections 948a–950w and other sections of Titles 10, 18, 28, and 42). 
57 See Department of Defense Order, ‘Administrative Review Procedures for Enemy Combatants in the 
Custody of the Department of Defense at Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba’, 11 May 2004; Deputy 
Secretary of Defense, ‘Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal’, 7 July 2004. 
58 Manual for Military Commissions, 18 January 2007, available at 
<http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/manual-mil-commissions.pdf>. 
59 Aradau, n 31, 495. 
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‘exceptional’ about the US government’s use of the Guantánamo Bay naval base to 
detain people without charge. In the 1990s, the US authorities, in an attempt to block 
Haitian and Cuban refugees from entering the United States, used Guantánamo over 
several years as an offshore processing centre, detaining tens of thousands of people.60 
 The same could be said of pretty much any of the other repressive measures 
introduced after September 11: rather than being exceptional and unrelated to the 
‘normal legal system’, their introduction was made possible by long-term structural 
conditions and they often build on previous laws. To again use the most prominent 
British example, detention of foreign terrorist suspects under the Anti-Terrorism, 
Crime and Security Act (ATCSA) 2001, it can hardly be argued, as Lord Hoffmann 
did in the Belmarsh case, that detention without charge or trial is ‘antithetical to the 
instincts and traditions of the people of the United Kingdom.’61 On the contrary, 
detention without trial of those thought to pose a national security risk has a long 
history in the United Kingdom. The first of a series of Habeas Corpus Suspension 
Acts, allowing the executive to hold individuals on treason charges without bringing 
them to trial, was introduced as early as 1688.62 During the second part of the 
nineteenth century, Ireland was governed with the use of detention powers that were 
shielded from any form of judicial supervision.63 The British government again relied 
upon preventive detention powers in both world wars to intern 30,000 and 28,000 
‘enemy aliens’ respectively.64 Furthermore, as Brian Simpson has pointed out, the 
power of executive detention was ‘always valued in the colonies’65 and, even in the 
waning years of the British Empire, used to incarcerate tens of thousands of 
troublesome political opponents.66 As far as the specific context of terrorism is 
                                                 
60 HH Koh, ‘America’s Offshore Refugee Camps’ (1994) 29 University of Richmond Law Review 139; 
A Kaplan, ‘Where Is Guantánamo?’ (2005) 57 American Quarterly 831. 
61 A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56, para. 86. 
62 RJ Sharpe, The Law of Habeas Corpus (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2nd edn, 1989) 94. 
63 AWB Simpson, In the Highest Degree Odious: Detention Without Trial in Wartime Britain (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1992), 3-4; AWB Simpson, Human Rights and the End of Empire (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2001) 79-80. 
64 Simpson (1992), n 63, 163. 
65 Simpson (2001), n 63, 876. 
66 In 1954, for instance, 30,000 people were arrested in Kenya in an operation designed to identify Mau 
Mau supporters. Ibid., 879-880. 
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concerned, detention without trial was a regular feature of a series of anti-terrorism 
laws applicable in Northern Ireland throughout the last century.67  
 The constant invocations of the exceptional nature of the post-September 11 
regimes not only obscure the fact that these sorts of repressive measures build on 
historical precedents and that they can, and have always been, accommodated by the 
‘normal’ legal system. They also help to legitimise other sets of current repressive 
measures by letting them appear normal in comparison to the allegedly exceptional 
anti-terrorism regimes. Detention without charge or trial, for example, far from being 
limited to the counter-terrorism context, is a common feature of every state’s legal 
system. Executive detention powers are employed against vagrants, the mentally ill, 
drug addicts, immigrants and other allegedly dangerous groups of people.68 Especially 
immigration detention has become a widespread phenomenon throughout the Western 
world in recent years.69 In the United Kingdom, for example, the immigration 
authorities detained approximately 35,000 foreign nationals in 2003.70 
Characterisations of detention without charge or trial as ‘antithetical to our instincts 
and traditions’ and as limited to the exceptional terrorism context thus distort the 
reality of mass incarceration at the executive’s behest. And when European 
government leaders brand Guantánamo as ‘anomaly’, then this could also be read as a 
conscious rhetorical move to deflect attention away from the deprivations of liberty to 
which tens of thousands of immigrants are subjected to in Europe on a daily basis.  
 
 
                                                 
67 Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland) 1922 and Northern Ireland (Emergency 
Provisions) Acts 1973-1998. See RJ Spjut, ‘Internment and Detention Without Trial in Northern 
Ireland 1971-1975: Ministerial Policy and Practice’ (1986) 49 Modern Law Review 712 and RJ Spjut, 
‘Executive Detention in Northern Ireland: The Gardiner Report and the Northern Ireland (Emergency 
Provisions) (Amendment) Act 1975’ (1975) 10 Irish Jurist 272. For a historical account, see J 
McGuffin, Internment (Tralee, Anvil Books, 1973). 
68 See European Convention on Human Rights, Art 5(1) (expressly authorising the detention of all 
these categories of persons). 
69 See J Hughes and O Field, ‘Recent Trends in the Detention of Asylum Seekers in Western Europe’ 
in Hughes and Liebaut (eds), Detention of Asylum Seekers in Europe: Analysis and Perspectives (The 
Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1998) 5; P Morante, ‘Detention of Asylum Seekers: The United 
States Perspective’ in ibid., 85; M Welch and L Schuster, ‘Detention of Asylum Seekers in the US, 
UK, France, Germany, and Italy: A Critical View of the Globalizing Culture of Control’ (2005) 5 
Criminal Justice: The International Journal of Policy and Practice 331. See also the Jesuit Refugee 
Service’s website on detention in Europe (http://www.detention-in-europe.org/) and the website of the 
International Detention Coalition (http://www.idcoalition.org/portal/index.php).  
70 Amnesty International, United Kingdom: Seeking Asylum is Not a Crime: Detention of People Who 
Have Sought Asylum, 20 June 2005, 43. 
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3. The rule of law 
From the fact that the post-9/11 measures are not exceptional, extra-legal phenomena, 
but firmly rooted in the legal system, the critical authors referred to above conclude 
that ‘it is not upholding the rule of law that seems tricky.’71 Thus, they warn against 
‘the endorsement of the “rule of law” by human rights lawyers’.72  
 Central to their argument in this respect is the quantity of legal regulations and 
mechanisms involved in contemporary anti-terrorism regimes. Hussain points to the 
‘sheer volume of these regulations’, specifying that ‘[t]he well-known torture 
memoranda … run into hundreds of pages.’73 Aradau highlights the ‘detailed rules 
and norms’ governing Guantánamo74 and the ‘maze of institutions’ operating there.75 
Johns argues that there is ‘a panoply of regulations’ governing the handling of the 
Guantánamo detainees and that since 2004 ‘the normative and institutional network at 
Guantánamo Bay has become even denser,’ so that it is now ‘a space filled to the brim 
with expertise, procedure, scrutiny and analysis’.76 Today, one could add to this that 
the Military Commissions Act of 2006, supplemented by the 238 pages-long Manual 
for Military Commissions issued in 2007, provides very detailed regulation of the 
commission trials. 
 Yet it is not clear how these repeated references to the sheer mass of 
regulations and procedures support the claim that it is futile to insist on the rule of 
law. Even a minimal, formal, conception of the rule of law77 requires more than just 
that there must be law, that power must be exercised through detailed legal regulation. 
According to Dicey’s classic formulation, the rule of law means, first, ‘the absolute 
supremacy or predominance of regular law as opposed to the influence of arbitrary 
power’, excluding ‘wide discretionary authority on the part of the government’.78 
                                                 
71 Johns, n 29, 618-19. 
72 Aradau, n 31, 498. 
73 Hussain, n 33, 742. 
74 Aradau, n 31, 491. 
75 Ibid., 496. 
76 Johns, n 29, 618. 
77 On the distinction between formal and substantive conceptions of the rule of law, see P Craig, 
‘Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical Framework’ (1997) Public 
Law 467. 
78 AV Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 
1959, 10th ed.) 202. 
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Second, it requires ‘equality before the law’.79 Third, it implies that ‘the rights of 
individuals’ are protected by common law ‘as defined and enforced by the courts’.80 
Whether the Guantánamo system and the numerous other post-September 11 
measures are compatible with a concept of the rule of law that builds on Dicey’s three 
elements is, at the very least, highly doubtful. A detailed analysis of this issue is 
beyond the scope of this chapter, and so I will only briefly list a few concerns. First, 
the laws on which contemporary counter-terrorism measures are based are – even 
though, it is true, often very voluminous – typically not clear, stable and determinate 
as required by the ‘regular law’ element. Instead, they are vague and flexible, giving 
the executive wide scope of discretion. For example, terrorist offences are normally 
very broadly and vaguely drafted.81 In addition, anti-terrorism laws grant law 
enforcement authorities wide discretionary powers to prevent terrorism, for instance 
to detain those who ‘endanger national security’,82 or to stop and search people 
without having to show reasonable suspicion.83 Second, counter-terrorism measures 
are typically based on distinctions between different categories of people (‘unlawful 
enemy combatants’ – ‘other combatants’, ‘citizens’ – ‘foreign nationals’ etc.) who are 
afforded different levels of legal protection or even subject, as in the case of the US 
military commissions, to trial before different types of tribunals. These categorisations 
undermine the principle of equality before the law. Since this issue is at the heart of 
the human rights violations committed in the ‘war on terror’, I will return to it in the 
following section. Third, post-September 11 laws tend to undermine the ability of 
courts to protect individual rights. Often these laws expressly exclude effective 
judicial review of the exercise of anti-terrorism powers84 or they replace proper courts 
with quasi-judicial mechanisms that are not independent from the executive. Neither 
the US Combatant Status Review Tribunals nor the military commissions nor any of 
                                                 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid., 203. 
81 See, for example, the offence of ‘encouragement of terrorism’ under section 1 of the British 
Terrorism Act 2006. 
82 USA Patriot Act, s 412. 
83 Terrorism Act 2000, s 44. 
84 E.g., USA Patriot Act, s 217. 
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the other legal institutions at Guantánamo referred to by the critical scholars are truly 
independent decision-making bodies.85 
In view of these different concerns, I find it difficult to understand how 
upholding the rule of law at Guantánamo and elsewhere in the ‘war on terror’ can be 
described as ‘not tricky’. Upholding the rule of law is in fact not only very tricky, but 
also of crucial importance as it is a highly effective means of protecting human rights 
in the ‘war on terror’. For one of the features of even a Diceyan conception of the rule 
of law, which is only concerned with the formal structure of the law, is that it has a 
power-restraining effect. It requires that the law must be general, that is, that rules 
must be ‘issued in advance to apply to all cases and all persons in the abstract.’86 The 
rule of law forces those in power to articulate their claims in terms of rules that are 
equally applicable to everyone, both the powerful and the powerless, and, as EP 
Thompson understood, thus renders them ‘prisoners of their own rhetoric’.87 In this 
way, the very form of law functions as a crucial inhibition on state power. As the 
Frankfurt-school jurist Franz Neumann observed, ‘[t]he generality and the 
abstractness of law together with the independence of the judge guarantee a minimum 
of personal and political liberty’.88 As such, these requirements of the rule of law have 
an ethical value.89  
Of course, this is not to say that the rule of law is, as Thompson claimed, an 
‘unqualified human good’.90 Rather, it also has an ideological, disguising function. In 
a class society, the generality of the law conceals the realities of substantive 
inequality. And, as explained above, states that would claim to be based on the rule of 
law have not only always been able to accommodate repressive measures within their 
ordinary legal system but by grounding them therein may also let them appear as 
normal and acceptable. At the same time, however, the rule of law also ‘has a socially 
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and politically protective function. It is equalising.’91 This is what Bob Fine has 
described as the ‘contradictory character’ of the rule of law: it may be part of the 
‘superstructure’, masking exploitation and oppression, but at the same time it is a 
crucial means of inhibiting the power of government and protecting the rights of the 
people.92 Therefore, it should not be discarded. Also in this respect, I would hold it 
with Neumann. If one replaces ‘universalism’ with ‘the rule of law’ in his following 
remark, then this is, I believe, a good summary of his view on the issue: ‘To abandon 
universalism because of its failures is like rejecting civil rights because they help 
legitimize and veil class exploitation, or democracy because it conceals boss control, 
or Christianity because churches have corrupted Christian morals. Faced with a 
corrupt administration of justice, the reasonable person does not demand a return to 
the war of each against all, but fights for an honest system.’93 
 The conclusion that it is futile to insist on the rule of law in the ‘war on terror’ 
because the post-September 11 measures involve detailed regulation and various legal 
mechanisms thus rests on a misunderstanding of the functions of the rule of law and 
an underestimation of its potential to restrict state power. Of course Guantánamo Bay 
is not an exceptional lawless space. And of course all the other post-September 11 
practices are not extraordinary phenomena that are somehow unrelated to the law. Yet 
just because law is implicated in the human rights violations committed in the ‘war on 
terror’ does not mean that there is no value in endorsing the rule of law. On the 
contrary, as I will try to show in the following section, rule-of-law arguments can be 
very effective tools to challenge what is arguably the root cause of these human rights 
abuses. 
 
 
4. Lessons for human rights campaigners and lawyers 
There are two main practical lessons for human rights campaigners and lawyers to be 
drawn from the above, largely theoretical, discussion. The first follows from my point 
about the (non-)exceptionality of counter-terrorism measures, the second from my 
point about the functions of the rule of law. 
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4.1 Reconsider campaigning focus 
If one agrees that the post-September 11 measures are not as exceptional as they are 
commonly depicted, then some of the leading human rights organisations should 
clearly reconsider their campaigning focus. Since, as Johns has pointed out, ‘it is the 
exception that rings liberal alarm bells’,94 most of the large human rights 
organisations have devoted a great – and, I would argue, disproportionate – share of 
their attention on counter-terrorism policies in recent years. Human Rights Watch, for 
example, set up a new programme devoted to Terrorism & Counterterrorism, 
alongside its more established programmes on the different regions of the world and 
issues such as women’s and children’s rights. Since September 11, the organisation 
has issued approximately 550 news releases, reports and other publications on the 
human rights impacts of counter-terrorism. In comparison, in the same time period, 51 
of its publications dealt with ‘health and human rights’ and approximately 170 each 
with ‘labor and human rights’ and ‘treatment of prisoners’.95 In the United Kingdom, 
much of the energy of national human rights organisations such as Liberty and other 
critical commentators has been absorbed by the numerous counter-terrorism proposals 
put forward by the government in recent years. Especially the proposed extension of 
pre-charge detention (14 days, 28 days, 42 days, 90 days etc.) has provoked countless 
campaigns, policy papers, demonstrations and even international interventions by 
celebrities such as Desmond Tutu.96 In contrast, Liberty’s most recent press release on 
Anti-Social Behaviour Orders – an issue affecting the human rights of thousands of 
people in the United Kingdom – dates from March 2006.  
 But above all it is the degree of attention that Guantánamo Bay has attracted 
over the last few years that is, in my view, out of all proportions. All international 
(and countless national) human rights organisations have been running major 
campaigns against Guantánamo for several years. There have been films, 
demonstrations, readings of poems and even a ‘virtual flotilla’ to Guantánamo. The 
secretary general of Amnesty International justified the considerable resources and 
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efforts invested by her organisation by claiming that Guantánamo is ‘the gulag of our 
time’.97 But if one was to make this kind of historical comparison (which I do not 
think one should), then surely ‘the gulag of our time’ is not Guantánamo with its now 
approximately 270 detainees but the worldwide web of immigration detention centres 
holding tens of thousands of people who have not committed any criminal offence.98 
From this perspective, it can be argued that most human rights organisations have 
fallen into the trap of blindly following the political agenda set by governments. Just 
like governments, they have made (counter-)terrorism their top priority, even though 
there are other human rights issues that are at least equally as pressing. 
 Of course, my argument is not that Guantánamo and other instances of 
counter-terrorism detention do not deserve attention because they affect only a 
relatively small number of people. Nor is all of the above to suggest that these battles 
against counter-terrorism policies do not deserve to be fought. Pre-charge detention of 
42 days can, and should, be opposed even if one thinks that there are more pressing 
human rights issues. Therefore, following on from the above discussion of the role of 
the rule of law, the following section makes a few suggestions as to how human rights 
litigation and campaigning strategies can be designed effectively in the ‘war on 
terror’. At the heart of these suggestions is my conviction that rule-of-law arguments 
should not be readily discarded but that, on the contrary, it is crucial to insist on the 
generality of the law. 
 
4.2 Invoke the rule of law 
A central aspect of the criticism of endorsements of the rule of law by the critical 
scholars is their warning against the common tendency to respond to governmental 
counter-terrorism measures by instigating litigation in national courts or international 
legal institutions.99 I assume that this warning against turning to judicial fora is more 
intended to reflect a supposedly radical theoretical position than meant as a concrete 
practical recommendation. If it was the latter, then it could not be described otherwise 
than as cynical. Who would seriously suggest that, for example, terrorist suspects 
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languishing in Guantánamo or elsewhere in indefinite detention should not exhaust 
every means available to them, whether legal or otherwise? 
 A second aspect of the scepticism towards an insistence on the rule of law is 
the characterisation of a strategy that relies on formal legal arguments as somehow 
‘too limited’. Instead, the critical school of thought calls for a ‘broader political 
response’ that would restore a sense of ‘decisional responsibility’. Yet often formal 
legal, rule-of-law based, arguments are the most promising ones, both as far as 
litigation strategies and political processes are concerned. In the following, I point to 
two ways in which invocations of the rule of law can be used as effective 
argumentative tools to challenge counter-terrorism policies. 
 First, as explained above, a central element of the rule of law is the 
requirement of equality before the law or formal equality. Insisting on equality before 
the law is a particularly promising litigation strategy to challenge counter-terrorism 
policies. As Neal Katyal has pointed out, it will often be difficult for courts to decide 
whether counter-terrorism measures are substantively correct, that is, whether they 
strike the right balance between liberty and security or not.100 Equality challenges do 
not require courts to make that decision: they are not about the what of anti-terrorism 
laws (that is, their substance) but about who is affected by them.101 In this sense they 
are, just like separation-of-powers arguments (which are about how counter-terrorism 
measures are passed), formal or procedural. As such, they are more likely to be 
successful in court. The petitioner in Hamdan v Rumsfeld won his case on the basis of 
a separation-of-powers argument.102 In A v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, the Belmarsh prisoners prevailed because the House of Lords found that 
there was no justification for treating them differently from British terrorist 
suspects.103 Since counter-terrorism policies typically involve distinctions between 
different categories of people, the same kind of equality challenges could be deployed 
to oppose numerous other government measures. Examples include the US military 
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commissions, which only have jurisdiction to try foreign nationals,104 or the 
widespread use of immigration restrictions as a means of countering terrorism.105 
 As the example of the Belmarsh case demonstrates, insisting on equality 
before the law is not only a promising litigation strategy: it may also have a profound 
impact on political processes. The original act providing for detention without trial, 
the ATCSA 2001, which was limited in scope to foreign nationals, had been passed 
with a comfortable majority and without attracting great public attention.106 However, 
once the House of Lords had found that the ATCSA was incompatible with the 
prohibition of discrimination, the government had to come up with legislation that 
was applicable to both foreign and British citizens. As a consequence, the proposed 
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 led to a major public debate on the relationship 
between liberty and security and to ‘parliament’s longest and sometimes rowdiest 
sitting for 99 years’.107 The act was only passed after the government had made 
substantial concessions, in particular by providing for greater involvement of the 
judiciary in the suggested control order process108 and by making the act’s key 
provisions subject to annual renewal by parliament.109 The extension of the scope of 
anti-terrorism powers to British citizens due to the House of Lords decision thus 
reshaped the debate in crucial ways. The discussants were forced to consider the 
possibility of the law being applied against themselves (or at least their constituents), 
and, as a consequence, the discussion now had to be articulated in terms of generally 
applicable rules and principles. This shift towards general rules resulted, as Thompson 
would have predicted, in a curtailment of the executive’s powers: preventive detention 
was replaced with lesser forms of restrictions on liberty, which, in addition, are 
subject to greater judicial control. The import of insisting on equality should not be 
overestimated: generally applicable rules are not necessarily good rules. The control 
order system introduced by the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 still raises a number 
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of important human rights issues.110 But it would be absurd to claim that control 
orders are not an improvement on indefinite detention in a high-security prison. 
 A second, so far less explored, way in which invoking the rule of law can 
serve as an effective instrument of challenging counter-terrorism policies is by 
insisting on another, closely related, aspect of it: the requirement that rules must be 
abstract and general rather than situation-specific. It is this requirement which, 
ultimately, secures equality before the law.111 In recent years, the generality and 
abstractness of the law has come under increased pressure, including in the field of 
criminal justice. Following September 11, numerous states have adopted special anti-
terrorism laws and created new specialised mechanisms and institutions, including ad 
hoc tribunals and special law enforcement agencies, to deal with terrorism.112 A 
similar regime specifically designed to counter terrorism is emerging at the 
international level.113 This special treatment approach is largely prompted by political 
pressures. Special laws are typically passed amidst great public outrage in the wake of 
terrorist attacks and designed to denounce terrorist acts, stigmatise the terrorists and 
reassure the public. As a consequence, those subject to these anti-terrorism regimes 
are inevitably singled out for particularly harsh treatment. To name just one example, 
the special terrorist sanctions regime imposed by the UN Security Council provides 
far less protection to those affected by the sanctions than is generally available under 
national and international law, in particular depriving them of the right to a fair 
hearing and the right to a judicial remedy.114 This inferior level of due process 
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protection has been judicially sanctioned on the basis that the Security Council’s 
sanctions resolutions, by virtue of Article 103 of the UN Charter, prevail over every 
other obligation of states under domestic or international law, including obligations 
under human rights treaties.115 In this sense, it is the notion that not all categories of 
people deserve the same level of legal protection and the corresponding fragmentation 
of the law at both the national and international level – the replacement of the general 
law by special, particularly restrictive, legal regimes – which is at the root of the 
human rights abuses committed in the ‘war on terror’. Opposing this dangerous trend 
by insisting on the rule-of-law requirement that norms must be generally applicable 
must therefore be a central element of any effective strategy to protect human rights. 
 The relevance of the principle of the generality of law reaches far beyond the 
counter-terrorism context. The emergence of a specialised anti-terrorism regime is 
arguably part of a wider trend whereby criminal justice systems increasingly rely on 
special powers to deal with ‘special’ crimes and risks.116 In the ‘risk society’,117 
government crime policies are concerned with categorising people according to their 
dangerousness and subjecting these different subpopulations to different risk 
management models.118 As also Hussain seems to acknowledge,119 the emergence and 
proliferation of such specialised regulatory models of repression (immigration law, 
Anti-Social Behaviour Orders, Sex Offender Orders etc.) makes an insistence on the 
rule of law, on general rules, today more important than ever before.  
 Finally, it is important to stress that a strategy of insisting on the rule of law 
and turning to the courts is not only a potentially very effective ‘tool’ of challenging 
                                                                                                                                            
Sanctions in the Fight against Terrorism – What about Human Rights?’, 97 ASIL Proceedings (2003) 
46. 
115 See European Court of First Instance, Case T-306/01, Yusuf and Al Barakaat International 
Foundation v. Council of the European Union and the Commission of the European Communities, 
[2005] ECR II-3533; Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council of the European Union and the Commission of 
the European Communities, [2005] ECR II-3649. 
116 C Walker, ‘50th Anniversary Article: Terrorism and Criminal Justice – Past, Present and Future’ 
(2004) Criminal Law Review 311, 325. 
117 U Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (London, Sage, 1992). 
118 For its integration of insurance techniques into processes and practices of crime control, Feeley and 
Simon have termed this development ‘actuarial justice’. M Feeley and J Simon, ‘Actuarial Justice: The 
Emerging New Criminal Law’ in D Nelken (ed), The Futures of Criminology (London, Sage, 1994). 
See already S Cohen, Visions of Social Control: Crime, Punishment and Classification (Cambridge, 
Polity Press, 1985), Chapter 4; N Reichman, ‘Managing Crime Risks: Toward an Insurance Based 
Model of Social Control’ (1986) 8 Research in Law, Deviance and Social Control 151; P O’Malley, 
‘Risk, Power and Crime Prevention’ (1992) 21 Economy and Society 252. 
119 Hussain, n 33, 752. 
 21
counter-terrorism policies but also an important ‘resource’ to mobilise wider political 
resistance and build up grassroots campaigns. This mobilising, ‘constitutive’ function 
of law and legal claim-making has been explored and convincingly established by a 
number of authors,120 including by Colm Campbell and Ita Connolly for the context of 
terrorism and counter-terrorism.121 There is no need to review these arguments in 
detail here. It is sufficient to note that, in view of this additional function of appeals to 
the law and the instigation of court proceedings, a position that outright rejects these 
strategies as ‘apolitical’ appears all the more unconvincing. In fact, such a position is 
arguably itself based on an untenable binary distinction between law and politics. 
 
 
Conclusion 
The critical perspective adds an important dimension to the understanding of how, 
and how not, to protect human rights in the ‘war on terror’. Critical scholars are right 
to point out that preventing human rights abuses is not simply a matter, as the 
dominant discourse would have it, of more regulation, legal mechanisms and judicial 
overview. Invocations of the lawlessness of anti-terrorism regimes only serve to 
obscure how the ‘normal’ legal system is implicated in, and may legitimise, human 
rights violations. 
Yet it does not follow from this observation that the rule of law has no role to 
play in a response to repressive counter-terrorism policies. Rejection of an 
endorsement of the rule of law and calls for its replacement by a ‘political response’ 
are based on an equally untenable distinction between law and politics and an 
oversimplification of the choice at hand. In fact, the perhaps most striking feature of 
the critical analyses of the ‘war on terror’ described above is that, framed in Schmitt’s 
and Agamben’s theoretical terms, they operate at an almost completely abstract level. 
None of the critical scholars referred to above explains what the suggested ‘political 
response’ might look like or what a ‘re-invigoration of that sense of the exception that 
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may be derived from the work of Carl Schmitt’122 might entail in practice.123 What 
exactly is meant by restoring ‘the experience of politics’124, ‘the space of political 
decision’125 and ‘decisional responsibility’?126 Should unfettered discretion be given 
to decision-makers at Guantánamo Bay as ‘the experience of deciding in 
circumstances where no person or rule offers assurance that the decision that one 
takes will be the right one’127 automatically ensures that they will respect the human 
rights of the detainees? And who should these decision-makers be – some military 
officer, some political body? To take a parallel case, was the problem with Abu 
Ghraib that the interrogators lacked a sense of decisional responsibility and authority? 
Or was perhaps not just the opposite the case? And does the call for deciding ‘under 
circumstances not pre-codified by pre-existing norms’128 imply that, for instance, the 
criteria for detention of terrorist suspects can be made up by whoever happens to be in 
charge of the decision? 
 Both the liberal and the critical schools of thought only obscure the issues at 
stake when they either reduce counter-terrorism practices to exceptional extra-legal 
phenomena or simply reject reliance on the rule of law as irrelevant and apolitical. 
Those concerned about human rights should neither pretend that Guantánamo Bay is 
some extraordinary lawless space nor should they forgo rule-of-law arguments when 
opposing the US government’s practices there. They do not need to choose between 
law and politics. Instead, they should try to identify the most promising tools of 
challenging repressive counter-terrorism policies. I have shown that often these will 
be insistence on the rule of law – especially the requirement that laws must be 
generally applicable – and instigation of court proceedings. Human rights activists 
should not be afraid to use these tools. Especially when they oppose the practices of a 
bureaucracy and a military machinery that see themselves as engaged in a war 
directed against particular groups of people, it is not enough to call for ‘political 
agency under conditions of radical doubt’ and to appeal to ‘decisional 
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responsibility’.129 In a climate where the blame for terrorism is increasingly put on 
foreign nationals and particular ethnic groups, it is crucial to defend the few existing 
legal checks to protect those in the political minority from being subject to the 
unrestrained power of the state. Of course, legal checks are by no means sufficient to 
prevent human rights abuses and may lend the respective legal system a degree of 
legitimacy it does not deserve. However, at least to me, it seems equally clear that this 
is not a reason to reject them. 
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